Johnson County, Tennessee’s one Confederate Company

 Johnson County is tucked far up into the corner of east Tennessee, boarded by North Carolina to the east and Virginia to the north. In 1860, the population was just 5,018 people. If you are looking for a detailed history of Johnson County and the War, you are not going to find one. In fact, other than the Jingling Hole that I wrote about previously, the only bit of information readily available is that Johnson County, which provided a company of men to the 13^th Tennessee Cavalry (US), was a pro-Union County. That may be true (much research still needs to be done. I suspect that Johnson County was more dissident that pro-Union.) However, Johnson County also supplied a company to the Confederate army as well.

Captain Thomas S. Rumbough, Company E, 16^th Battalion (Neal’s) Tennessee Cavalry, was assigned to supervise and organize a new cavalry company. Rumbough appears to be from Greene County, and was killed in the fighting on November 15, 1864, at Morristown, Tennessee. Rumbough’s role in organizing the company is not exactly clear. The Johnson County cavalry company was organized on September 7, 1862, in Taylorsville, now Mountain City. Lieutenant Barton R. Brown, Company D, 1^st North Carolina Cavalry, was assigned to this new company and promoted captain. Including Brown, there were eighty-five men in this company. On November 1, 1862, they were mustered into service as Company F, 7^th Battalion North Carolina Cavalry.  The 7^th Battalion was under the command of Col. George N. Folk.

For the next few months, the 7^th Battalion was in east Tennessee, charged with breaking up bands of disloyal men and bushwhackers in Johnson and Carter counties. In December 1862, they were near Blountville, and in February, in Jonesborough. June found the battalion under the command of General John Pegram. They proceeded into Kentucky, skirmishing at Simpson’s Ford and Monticello. Later that month, they followed in the wake of destruction of Carter’s Raid above Knoxville. Following this, they rotated between garrison duty at Big Gap Creek, and participated in raids into Kentucky.

On August 3, 1863, the 7^th Battalion, along with the 5^th Battalion North Carolina Cavalry, were consolidated into the 6^th North Carolina Cavalry, with Folk as their colonel. The Johnson County’s company became Company A, 6^th North Carolina Cavalry. There was much skirmishing the following month. The regiment followed the bulk of Confederate forces from East Tennessee to North Georgia and were involved in the battle of Chickamauga. The next few months were spent in Tennessee engaging the Federals. In February 1864, Folk moved the regiment to Weldon, North Carolina. They spent the rest of the war in eastern North Carolina, picketing places along the railroad. In May, they skirmished with Federal forces advancing toward Raleigh. Instead of surrendering, the regiment was disbanded at the end of the war.

So what became of the rank and file? It appears that the company records end in November 1864. Due to the scattered condition of the regiment, only a few received their paroles at the end of the war. These included Pvt. Thomas W. Arnold (Ridgeway, NC); Pvt. E.H. Dougherty (Greensboro, NC); Pvt. James H. Floyd (Greensboro, NC); H. T. Grant (Nash County, NC); James Greene (Greensboro, NC); Isaac Hayes (Nash County, NC); Pvt. William Johnson (Nash County, NC); Daniel Mast (Nash County, NC); Pvt. Thomas A. Roberts (Greensboro, NC); Pvt. John S. Smith (Greensboro, NC); Pvt. Thomas Sutherland (Nash County, NC); Pvt. Daniel Wagner (Nash County, NC); Pvt. Jacob Wagner (Charleston, WV).

Several men were captured during various engagements. These include Lt. Wiley F. Thomas; Pvt. James B. Blair; Pvt. William B. Brown; Pvt. James F. Edwards; Cpl. William F. Elrod; Pvt. Lula Glover; Pvt. P.H. Johnson; Pvt. Hiram Jones; Sgt. J.S. Mast; Pvt. Valentine B. Mast; Pvt. William C. Mast; Pvt. James Parker; Pvt. John C. Parker; Pvt. Thomas Potter; Pvt. G.W. Robinson; Pvt. David B. Wagner;

Pvt. William Lefler, captured at Philadelphia, Tennessee, October 20, 1863, died of disease at Fort Delaware on July 28, 1864. Orderly Sergeant J.N. McQuown died in a hospital in Marietta, Georgia on October 1, 1863, of unknown causes. Pvt. James B. Smith died at Camp Chase, Ohio, February 9, 1864.

Pvt. John Lunsford was captured at Philadelphia, Tennessee, October 20, 1863, and later took the Oath and joined the 2nd United States Volunteers. Pvt. James O. Moreland was captured at Monticello, Kentucky, June 9, 18633, imprisoned at Camp Chase and Johnson’s Island, took the Oath and joined the 93^rd New York Infantry.

At least two soldiers were wounded:  Joseph F. H. Johnson, bugler, was reported absent wounded. Cpl. E.C.D. McEwen was wounded during the battle of Chickamauga, and apparently never rejoined his company. Pvt. D.C. Sutherland was reported missing in action following the battle of Chickamauga.

There are a lot of unanswered questions about these men. For those who have no parole information, were they sick in some hospital? Did they desert and go home? Or maybe they joined a Federal regiment? In time, it might be possible to dig through the various census reports and family histories and build a more complete picture of the lives of the men who formed Johnson County, Tennessee’s only Confederate company.

 

You can read a little more about the war in this area here:

The Jingling Hole 

George N. Folk and the raid at Fish Springs.

Not that "hegemonic": Washington County, TN

Was it really Witcher's Cavalry?

The Guerrilla War in Florida and North Carolina

 

At times we get caught up in the bigger War, epitomized by places like Chancellorsville or the Atlanta Campaign. There was, however, another war being fought while this bigger War was taking place. It was a much more personal War. Two events--the June 1864 Camp Vance Raid in western North Carolina and the July 1864 Bayport-Brooksville Raid along the Gulf Coast of Florida--are good examples of the episodes taking place in that "other" War.

It might be argued that the Confederate conscription law hit North Carolina the hardest. Thousands of men had no desire to serve in the Confederate army. They simply wished to be left alone. Yet the law forced them into service. Two training camps were established, one in Raleigh, and eventually, one in the western part of the state near Morganton; this latter base was named Camp Vance. Once eastern Tennessee fell to Federal forces in the fall of 1863, Camp Vance became a tempting target. In the spring of 1864, a Tennessee Unionist, George W. Kirk, received permission to recruit his own regiment, and he devised a plan to capture Camp Vance. He led a force of around 120 men through the wilderness, and on June 28, surrounded and captured the Confederate base. Captured at Camp Vance were three companies of junior reserves, then in the process of organization, and an unknown number of men who had been held in the guardhouse (40-50 men, maybe). Kirk then set fire to the camp, burned a local railroad depot and train, and began his return up the mountain toward Tennessee. Along the route, he was forced to fend off several attacks by local troops. In one of these attacks, Kirk used some of the junior reserves as human shields and laughed about the Confederates shooting their own men. Upon crossing the crest of the Blue Ridge, Kirk played a part in burning the home of Col. John B. Palmer (58th NCT), and destroying the Cranberry Iron Works.  He eventually returned to east Tennessee with 150 prisoners, 40 slaves, abundant horses and mules and other plunder, and numerous recruits for his own regiment, the 3rd North Carolina Mounted Infantry (US). The men Kirk recruited for this raid were from western North Carolina. The guides he used were dissidents who were living in the area.  The men he recruited for his regiment were also from the area.  One of the most critical points about the regiment that Kirk raised, the 3rd North Carolina Mounted Infantry (US) is often overlooked: they did not join the United States army for some lofty goal, like preserving the Union. These men crossed over the Tennessee/North Carolina line long enough to join the Federal army, to get fed, clothed, and armed, and then slipped back across the border to raid the farms, homes, and businesses of local pro-Southern people. The 3rd NCMI (US) never functioned as a regiment until April and May 1865, when it became a part of Stoneman's Raid. Their war was much more personal, and it was almost always waged against former friends, personal enemies, and even family.

In some ways, the Brooksville-Bayport Raid bears many similarities to Kirk's Camp Vance Raid. The 2nd Florida Cavalry (US) was organized in late 1863 and early 1864 and consisted of pro-Union, or at least anti-Confederate, Florida men. Just who conceived the plan of a raid into Hernando County is unknown. On June 30, 1864, two companies of the 2nd Florida Cavalry (US) and two companies of the 2nd United States Colored Troops set out from Fort Myers. Their purpose was to disrupt the movement of cattle heading north toward the main Confederate army in Tennessee, and to the civilian market in places like Charleston. After disembarking near Anclote Key, the group moved inland. They were under the command of Capt. John F. Bartholf, 2nd USCT. There were, however, plenty of men serving in the two companies of Florida Cavalry who were from the very area through which they were marching. As in Kirk's Raid, there were several small skirmishes fought along the way.  Contesting the advance of the Federals were members of the First Battalion, Special Cavalry, at times referred to as the Cow Cavalry. At one point during the raid, Capt. Leroy G. Lesley (CS) rode out under a flag of truce and, according to a Federal officer, "induced Capt. Greene and myself [Lt. William McCullough] to desert the Union cause, and move back to Dixie." The Federals raided numerous farms along the raid route, including Lesley's, taking food and pretty much whatever else suited them. Several homes and/or outbuildings were burned, and salt works were broken up. The Federals never actually reached Brooksville, but they  turned back toward the west and, on July 11, reached the Bayport Inlet. The US Navy had arrived the day before. The Confederate cannon that could have been captured had been relocated a few days before-- to Brooksville.

While the organizers of these two raids might have stated lofty goals on paper - the capture of Camp Vance and the destruction of railroad bridges for Kirk's Raid, or the disruption of the flow of cattle for the Bayport-Brooksville Raid, what was accomplished was much more personal, more bitter. These were raids conducted by "union" men who had been run out of the areas that they called home. While the war was far from being won in the summer of 1864, these local Unionists seized upon the recent gains in east Tennessee and the lack of protection in Florida in order to exact a measure of revenge on their former neighbors.

In the long run, the raids did benefit the Union's war aims. Kirk's raid demonstrated just how open western North Carolina was to attack, while the Bayport-Brooksville Raid deprived the Southern Confederacy of much-needed supplies. Both raids further added to the demoralizing effects the war was having on the Southern people.  

Do Monuments Teach History?

North Carolina Monument, Gettysburg

   There have been a couple of articles floating about the past couple of weeks about how monuments really don’t teach history to people. If you are looking for an in-depth description of the battle of Gettysburg, with the various movements and turns over four days, the Pennsylvania monument nor the North Carolina monument are going to do it for you. You will need to turn to Coddington’s The Gettysburg Campaign or the books by Phanz or Wert on each day of the battle to get that painstakingly detailed level of study that can truly help you understand that battle. But on the other hand, I believe these monuments are far more important than any class a teacher or professor can offer. What the monuments can do, better than a detailed study, is capture the imagination of a young person.

   Probably the first historic site I ever visited was the Castillo de San Marcos in St. Augustine. I was probably seven or eight or nine years old. I have no recollection of any of the talks by the park rangers, nor do I remember any display panels that I have might have paused in order to read, but I do remember the place.  I remember crawling on a cannon (probably discouraged then, too), standing on the parapet and straining to look out into the Matanzas River, trying to catch a glimpse of the Atlantic Ocean. It was the place that captured my attention, and probably helped fuel my passion for Southern history.

Otway Burns Monument, Burnsville

   Fast-forward thirty or so years to Gettysburg, at the North Carolina monument that so magnificently shows the struggle, the anguish on the faces of Tar Heel soldiers as they strive to punch a hole in the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge. I was once standing, talking to some friends about those memorable minutes on July 3. Up pulls a minivan. Door flies open, and out pours a little fellow, maybe five or six. He was in awe over the size of the monument and had a zillion questions which his parents really could not answer. (I wonder what it was like at the Virginia monument right down the road?) I have seen this scenario repeated time and time again – at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, in the rocket garden at Kennedy Space Center, and at monuments great and small in little towns spread out across the landscape.

   Monuments are great places to begin a conversation. Let’s go visit the statue to Capt. Otway Burns in Burnsville, North Carolina. We can stand at its base and I can tell you about the life of Burns, about how he was a privateer during the War of 1812 (anyone remember that one?), and about the struggle to get new counties formed in the western part of North Carolina. Burns’s vote in the General Assembly to establish this new county cost him the next election but got the town named for him. Or, we can head to the campus of Appalachian State University and sit on a log next to the statue of Daniel Boone. Right over there, across the road from the monument, was the cabin of Benjamin Howard, a cabin that Boone used as he was hunting in the area. You can see the ridge rising above the town, and Boone would have been able to use that ridge as a guide. You follow that ridge (named Rich Mountain) and you can get to the gap that will lead you into Tennessee, and on toward Cumberland Gap, and Kentucky. Boone was a complex man, a frontiersman, a politician, struggling to co-exist with the Natives, and was probably a wee bit crazy.

Daniel Boone Monument, Boone

   We all know that people in the United States don’t visit historic places as they once did. It is too complicated. Too many forms to fill out for a field trip for those in elementary school, and in university classes, those people who made us who we are today, with their complicated lives that don’t seem to mesh with the morals (or lack thereof) of people in the twenty-first century, are not in vogue. Why should we study Gettysburg, or Burns, or Boone?

   As monuments to Founding Fathers and Civil War soldiers are ripped from the ground, we lose the ability to have places to start those discussions. We lose the ability to pique the interest of the young and old alike. Sure, we can bring it up in a classroom. But given the level of historical illiteracy in this country right now, how is that working out?

    You may totally disagree with my assessment. And that’s ok. Please feel free to move right along. But my opinion is based upon my own personnel observations. The thousands of monuments that grace our historical landscape still have a great deal to teach us, and those places can be touchstones that lead to deeper understanding.

Feeding the Army of Northern Virginia update

   Friends, we have a manuscript! 152 pages, 61,785 words, and 300 sources. Actually, that happened about a week ago. I’ve read it twice, the Mrs. has read it once. I’ve been working on formatting the notes, and it still has a couple more readings to go before it will go off to other readers.

   There are seven chapters, plus the introduction, prologue, and bibliography. They are:

Introduction

Prologue:  Pre-war Foodstuffs

Chapter 1: Army Issued Food/Camp

Chapter 2: Food from Home

Chapter 3: Food on campaign and in battle

Chapter 4: Food and the plight of the sick and wounded

Chapter 5: Feeding Robert E. Lee and the Confederate High Command

Chapter 6: Camp Servants

Chapter 7: Food, Morale, and Memory

   Over the past two and a half years I have learned a great deal. While there are other books on food, such as Smith’s Starving the South and Hurt’s Agriculture and the Confederacy, there is nothing quite like Feeding the Army of Northern Virginia on the market. This tome looks at one specific place and one specific army, for four years. I’m really excited about this one. (If I am wrong and there is another book on any specific Civil War army and food out there, please let me know.)

   In the next month or so, it will probably be off to the publishers. And then the waiting game begins. It usually takes at least a year for it to make the rounds (editor, layout, proofreader, etc.) and become an actual book. And in the turbulent times in which we live, it might just take longer.

   Time to start thinking about the next one…

Two Bad Maps in the Peninsula Campaign

   It is sometimes easy for us to sit back and relish in the campaign maps that we have available at our fingertips. I have a large notebook full of maps from the American Battlefield Trust, and on my shelves are books with maps of campaigns like Antietam and Gettysburg. (Savas Beattie is producing some fine map volumes these days.) But for commanders during the war, this was not often true. Two faulty maps during the Peninsula Campaign in 1862 changed the course of battle.

   Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan commanded the Federal Army of the Potomac. Appointed commander following the disastrous route at First Manassas, McClellan built a fine army – over 100,000 men, well armed, well equipped. After his first plan of circumnavigating the Confederate entrenchments near Manassas by taking a route down the Chesapeake River to Urbanna fell apart due to the repositioning of Confederate forces, McClellan chose to land his army at Fortress Monroe and move quickly up the Peninsula and capture Richmond. The first part of his plan worked well, for a day. Then he quickly discovered that the map he was studying was incorrect. McClellan believed that the Warwick River paralleled the James River. McClellan had even considered moving gunboats into the Warwick River to protect his left flank as he advance toward Richmond. Instead, the Warwick River flowed more across the Peninsula, and, the Confederates had built extensive works behind the river. Plus, the foliage on the Confederate side blocked the view of McClellan’s scouts, and he had no idea just how many Confederates were on the other side. McClellan called for a siege. It took a month to construct works and haul heavy cannons into place. All the while, his men were getting sick in the swamps that surrounded them. The force that McClellan faced on April 1: 13,000 Confederate soldiers. That inaccurate map cost McClellan a chance to quickly move on Richmond, and it cost him men and material.

   But there is another case of a poorly drawn map. This one cost the Confederates. After the wounding of Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston at Seven Pines on May 31, Robert E. Lee was placed in command of the newly styled Army of Northern Virginia. Lee developed a plan in which Stonewall Jackson’s force would leave the Shenandoah Valley and arrive on the battlefield below Richmond. Once in position, he could flank the Federals while other Confederate divisions’ assaults pressured the front. Yet on day one of the offensive, June 26, Jackson sat at Hundley’s Corner, two and a half miles north of where he should have been. This intersection was not on his map. According to Stephen Sears, “Jackson apparently reasoned that it would be late before he could reach the scene and to move blindly would be dangerous in any event. He elected to put his army in bivouac for the night and await the new day to set matters straight.” (To the Gates of Richmond, 199) Jackson’s bad map proved costly to the Confederates. Brig. Gen. Lawrence Branch and his brigade, the link between Jackson and the rest of the Confederate army, after receiving word from Jackson earlier in the day that he was close (he was not), marched toward Mechanicsville. Skirmishing broke out. A. P. hill believed that everything was in place and launched his attack. As the day worn on, other Confederate divisions became involved. Several attacks were repulsed, and Lee lost somewhere around 1,500 men. The only positive outcome was that the Federals abandoned their position on that night.

   Two events, the same campaign, two mad maps.

How Long did Hampton’s Beef Steak Raid Feed the Troops?

   In September 1864, Confederate cavalry commander Wade Hampton made a raid on a Federal herd of beef. It was a daring raid behind Union lines that helped fill a few empty Confederate bellies. One question might be: how long did the captured beef last?

   Pork was the preferable army ration. It was easier to process just about anyplace and transport, and, it would keep for longer periods. Yet once the salt began to become scarce, Confederate commissaries began to use more beef. Plus, beef could move with an army and be slaughtered near the troops. Both Confederates and Federals drove herds of cattle with their armies, both in the east and west.

   In September, a Confederate scout reported that 3,000 loosely guarded cattle were penned at Coggins Point, Virginia. When Hampton learned this, he gained permission from Robert E. Lee to attack. General Hampton assembled a force of 3,000 troopers, and set off on the morning of September 14, riding around the flank of the Union army. The following day, Hampton captured the cattle, along with hundreds of Federal prisoners, and began to drive back toward the Federal lines. There were some attempts to catch Hampton, but he returned to the Confederate lines with almost 2,500 cattle.

   The captured beef was soon being issued to the men in the trenches. “We draw very good rations now. We get some good Yankee beef and some bacon and good flour,”  wrote a member of the 45^th Georgia on September 24.[1] “Rations of beef issued,” highlighted a member of the 7^th South Carolina Cavalry the next day.[2] On October 14, a member of the 18^th North Carolina told the folks back home that “I have just eaten a harty brakefast beaf staek, soda bread, pure coffee well sweetened- honey &c. You may guess how my health is."[3] By October 23, a member of the 13^th South Carolina would write that “We have eaten nearly all the beef Hampton captured recently in rear of Grant’s army.”[4] The South Carolina soldier went on to write that they were starting to get some beef from North Carolina. It might also be added that there were some provisions coming from the Shenandoah Valley, captured by Jubal Early’s men. Regardless, it might be safe to assume that the cattle captured by Wade Hampton were closed to be being exhausted by the end of October.

   The almost 2,500 beef captured lasted only a month, feeding the men in the Petersburg entrenchments. One unanswered question: did the Federals have other stock pens of cattle in this same time period? 3,000 head of cattle does not seem to have been adequate for such a large force. (Of course, the Federals were able to receive regulation rations of salt pork at this time.) Just one more little piece of the war.

  

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[1] McCrea, Red Dirt and Isinglass, 514.

[2] Hinson and Waring,  “The Diary of William G. Hinson during the War of Secession,” The South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 75, No.  2, 111.

[3] Hancock, Four Brothers in Gray, 283.

[4]  Welch, A Confederate Surgeon’s Letters to his Wife, 110-111.

Hardtack v. flour v. corn meal

   A friend recently asked the question: “did Southern troops ever live off of Hardtack like Federal soldiers?” That’s a great question! And the simple answer is: sometimes.  (PS: this article is based on my research for my upcoming book, Feeding the Army of Northern Virginia.)

   Hardtack is made from flour, water, and sometimes salt. This mixture is rolled out and cut into pieces that are baked until, well, hard. They have been around for a long time and are also known as sea biscuits, or ship’s biscuits, or many other names. A standard issued of hardtack for Federal soldiers, for a day, was one pound, or about ten pieces. Hardtack is not a term frequently used in letters and diaries written during the war by Confederate soldiers in the East. It does appear more frequently in post-war writings. And, when the term hardtack is used, it usually denotes captured foodstuffs. For example, a member of the 13^th Virginia Infantry, writing after the war, noted that at Second Manassas, he drew from his haversack “a piece of fat pickled pork and some hardtack—the rations I had selected from the varied assortment at Manassas.”[1] While at Frederick, Maryland, in September 1862, one member of the 15^th Georgia complained that all of their hardtack was marked “’Cincinnati.’ It is a common remark that Banks is Jackson’s Quartermaster and Commissary.”[2]     

   More often, Confederates referred to their hardtack as crackers. A member of the 5^th Alabama Infantry, writing from a camp near Fairfax Court House on July 16, 1861, noted that he was stationed as a guard at the commissary tent, presumably just for his regiment. He reported that he was guarding twenty-five barrels of crackers. A few days later, this same soldier reported that there was no flour locally, and they had to make use of crackers instead, and that “they are hard almost as a rock.”[3] Many soldiers found their crackers almost inedible. A member of the 44^th North Carolina complained in October 1862 that the “Crackers you cannot brake them hardly with your hands. Yesterday Mr. Sykes had some Crackers beatting them up with a... hammer and said to me it is hard bread to have to take a hammer to brake it."[4]

    Soldiers were likely to be issued flour than hardtack. Earlier in the war, the Confederate government had purchased a bakery in Richmond to bake loaves of bread to be shipped to the men in the field. This really did not work, as the “light bread” as the soldiers called it, went moldy before it could arrive in the camps. Instead, the commissary department switched to grinding flour and shipping it to the front ranks. Ideally, flour would be issued to troops in camp, while crackers would be issued to men on the march. Most of the crackers which the men mention eating while on campaign seem to have been captured by the Federals. Instead, the men had to make do with flour, and usually no cooking utensils. From Manassas in July 1861, a member of the 10^th Alabama complained that they had to bake their dough on planks and boards.[5] At Beverly Ford on August 22, a member of the 12^th Georgia wrote of baking their dough on flat boards and stones before the fire.[6] On the way to Gettysburg in June 1862, a member of the 26^th North Carolina wrote home that they were drawing flour. They stopped at 4:00 pm and commenced cooking.[7]  

   That’s not to say that the flour also did not come from the Federals. There are mentions of barrels of flour captured at Ball’s Bluff, during the Rominey Campaign, Seven Pines, Manassas Junction, and Williamsport, and taken from civilians during the Gettysburg campaign and Early’s Washington campaign in 1864.

   Not everyone was in favor of the flour. A member of the 53^rd Georgia wrote from near Hagerstown on July 13 that he had eaten so much flour bread that he preferred corn bread.[8] Corn meal was a third option. A member of the 1^st Maryland wrote from Fairfax Court House in early August that they were able to make first-rate cornbread.[9] Yet even this wore on some. South Carolinian Barry Benson wrote after the war that they were issued so much corn meal in the winter of 1863 that “our teeth staid on edge; even freshly cooked, the bread would taste sour.”[10] While cornbread might seem like a Southern staple, the corn meal ground during the war, epically, late in the war, was full of husk and kernels. “Often the corn meal issued to us… [was] so bad that hardtack… was hailed with delight,” wrote a member of the 17^th Virginia in 1864.[11] From camp near Orange Court House in March 1864, one Tar Heel told the people at home that they were drawing “tolerable good rations,” including corn meal. However, he wished he could draw flour. “We are tired of meal."[12]

   As the war grinned on, there was never enough, whether it be crackers, wheat flour, or corn meal. Most of it really depended on the environment. (But that’s another post.)  A soldier simply had to draw “his waist belt a little tighter… and waited with bated breath the order to clear our works and charge the enemy.” If the charge was successful, then the “enemey’s camps furnished the rations we failed to get in the morning…”[13]

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[1] Swank, Raw Pork and Hartack, 34.

[2] Ivy W. Duggan Diary, UGA, 95-96.

[3] Hubbs, Voices from Company D, 18, 25-26.

[4] Wright, The Confederate Letters of Benjamin H. Freeman, 14.

[5] Rourke, "I saw the Elephant, 15

[6] Ivy W. Duggan Diary, UGA, 87-88. 

[7] Smith and Price, “Your Affectionate Husband Until Death" Company Front, 55.

[8] Ronald, ed. The Stilwell Letters, 188.

[9] McKim, A Soldier’s Recollections, 46.

[10] Benson, Berry Benson's Civil War Book, 55.

[11] Toalson, No Soap, No Pay, 94-95

[12] Hancock, Four Brothers in Gray, 253.

[13] Herbert, “The Seventeenth Virginia Infantry,” SHSP, 12:294.

Bad Barrels

   Thomas Ballard was born ca.1825 in Virginia. He was proprietor of the Ballard House hotel in Richmond prior to the war, and at the age of 36 or 37, could have stayed at home. Instead, Ballard volunteered and was mustered in as a private on May 23, 1861, in the 4^th Virginia Cavalry. Two months later, he was promoted to assistant commissary of subsistence and assigned to Ashland, Virginia, then on November 25, assigned to Monterey, Virginia. Ballard then transferred to various commands over the course of the war. He was with Elzey and Trimble in 1862, and with Ed. Johnson in 1863. He was promoted to major and assigned to John B. Gordon in June 1864, and then to R. H. Anderson in October 1864. At some point, he was on the staff of John C. Breckinridge. (Krick, Staff Officers in Gray, 66)

   Ballard’s compiled service record from the National Archives is actually quite lengthy. Most of it is made up of requisitions for forage for horses, or stationery, but there are a couple of interesting pieces. One of these is an account for lost or damaged commissary stores in 1862. Ballard’s notes are a good example of the trials and tribulations of commissary officers.

I. On or about the 9^th of August 1862, during the night to supply the troops on the battlefield at “Cedar Run” one wagon loaded with two barrels of flour, packed in old second hand and very badly exposed barrels, upset, the barrels busted and the flour was strewn in the mud, losing about [9 lbs.]

II. On the same march by sifting through badly coopered barrels [8 lbs]

III. On or about the 15^th of August 1862, while issuing rations on the Rappahannock, near Jefferson, our [train] was shelled by the enemy. The army falling back at the same time nececated [necessitated] the abandonment of [5 lbs]

IV. On or about the 29^th of August 1862, on the march from Gaines Cross Roads, crossing the Rappahannock then swollen from recent rains, part of the time under shelling of the enemy near Subley Mills, the road in wretched condition, lost by the bursting of barrels, upsetting of one wagon and by getting wet in the river [10 lbs]

V. September 5 to 13^th 1862. On the march from Leesburg, crossing the Potomac via Frederick City [and] Boonesboro, and recrossing the Potomac at Williamsport, lost from getting wet in the river from bad coopering [20 lbs]

VI. On or about the 18^th of September 1862 by order of Genl Jackson a days rations was taken across the Potomac and deposited about two miles from Sharpsburg. Some of the troops being in line it could not all be issued before night, the wagon having been previously ordered to the Va side of the river. The army fell back during the night. We were compelled to abandon fourteen barrels. 14.

[Total lost in about six weeks: 61 pounds.]

I. During the month of October 1862, while encamped at [and] near Bunker Hill, the command was supplied with Flour by purchasing wheat [and] having it ground at various mills – new barrels could not be had and the flour was packed in old barrels. In some cases were used three or four times. The roads to some of the mills were very rough [and] much of the flour was necessarily wasted in transporting it in open barrels, over these roads… [18 bls.]

II. On the march from Berryville to Bunker Hill Winchester, thence across the Blue Ridge at Milams Gap, and down to the battlefield at Fredericksburg  the train was loaded with flour packed in very old [and] badly coopered barrels—lost by breaking of bands [and] sifting [10 lbs]

III. From about the 18^th December 1862 to the 28^th April 1863 the Division was encamped at Moss Neck from eight to ten miles from the Railroad Depot at Guiney’s Station and our supplies were transported this distance over roads almost impassible. Such was the condition of the roads that four or five barrels of flour were a load for a four horse wagon. A part of the winter the roads were utterly impassible with wagons and our supplies were transported by means of pack horses. This rendered necessary the packing of flour into sacks causing much loss. The flour issued to Maj Ballard during all the winter was in bad condition, barrels often bursting open in the roads from bad cooperage, in some instances with the top of almost every barrel. His loss from these causes during the winter was certainly not less tham twenty-eight barrels.

IV. On or about the 1^st day of December 1862 at Orange CH one wagon was abandoned in consequence of the deaths of three horses of the team. Lost [thereby] four barrels.

Total sixty nine barrels.

   While Ballard’s accounting might seem tedious, there is actually a lot to unpack here. It seems that the Confederacy not only suffered from a lack of wagons (check out my blog post here and here), they suffered from inadequate supply of barrels. They were second hand, or had been used several times. They were badly constructed, and at time burst open. The barrels leaked, or “sifted” the flour out.  Commissary trains could be shelled by the enemy. The roads were so bad during the winter of encampment of 1862-63 that pack horses and bags replaced wagons and barrels.

   Ballard survived the war. He returned to the hotel business and died in 1902 in Salem, Virginia.

Confederate Coffee

   I think we can all agree that coffee played a crucial role in the lives of Confederate soldiers. And, as it has become apparent to me recently, in reading articles and watching podcasts, some scholars really don’t grasp the usage of coffee in the Army of Northern Virginia. We hear the stories about how the Confederates in Virginia had to make do with no coffee and relied on plenty of coffee substitutes, like chicory, acorns, sweet potatoes, etc. But my research into Confederate foodstuffs while working on Feeding the Army of Northern Virginia over the past two years has led to some different conclusions. (The following is based upon 200 sets of letters and diaries, with a few reminiscences added in.)

   Coffee was a staple of life in the Old South. It was imported from Central and South America. In the early days of the war, it was issued to Confederate soldiers in Virginia. It was mentioned in letters home from Portsmouth and Ashland in May 1861. It was also issued green. “You would see much to amuse you especially about cooktime. Just imagine Charly Palmore standing over a hot fire parching coffee in a pan stirring with a big camp knife,” chronicled a soldier in the 3^rd Virginia Cavalry in June 1862, from Ashland.[1] Coffee continued to be issued through August. However, many soldiers speculated that this “treat” might be coming to an end. From Vienna, Virginia, a soldier in the 2^nd South Carolina Infantry wrote on August 3 that "We soldiers still get coffee for night and morning, but I do not doubt but that this luxury will soon be denied us. I say luxury. Coffee is the luxury in a soldier's life. A cup of hot coffee can be better appreciated in camp than anywhere else...”[2] By September 1, an Alabama soldier stationed near Fairfax Court House reported that they were out of coffee and sugar, yet reported on September 10 that they had coffee, but no sugar.[3] A member of the 4^th Georgia reported in October that they were drawing whiskey in leu of coffee.[4] This continued through October, although some soldiers who did not drink would sell their whiskey rations to soldiers who did, leaving a few tipsy men in the ranks.  On November 28 came the first mention of rye coffee. A Virginia soldier stationed near Huntersville, wrote home that "We are living well at present on venison, beef, corn and wheat bread, rye coffee & sweetened with maple sugar.”[5] Considering the soldier was stationed in present-day West Virginia, it could simply have been a problem of getting coffee that great distance.

   Coffee was being issued in early 1862. A Tarheel Heel soldier reported small issues of coffee and sugar at camp near Union Mills on January 18, and an Alabama soldier stationed at Louisa Court House wrote of a weekly coffee ration, without sugar.[6] Coffee then disappears from the letters. A member of the 3^rd South Carolina wrote at the end of April, while stationed on the Peninsula, that they never saw coffee being issued.[7] This holds true through May and the spring campaigns. There are sporadic mentions of coffee through October. Some soldiers reported having coffee, but it is unclear if they were being issued, or captured. (This is another topic for a future post.) Coffee was available for purchase. A Tar Heel officer, near Winchester in mid-November 1862, wrote that coffee was selling for $3.00 a pound.[8]

   By early 1863, coffee seemed to be in short supply. A member of the 45^th Georgia wrote of wheat coffee in January, while a Virginia officer made mention of “rye coffee well sugared.”[9] In March, a South Carolinian mentioned living on nothing but coffee and bread: “We buy the coffee from sutlers in one pound papers already ground for one dollar. It is Confederate coffee made of I dont know what. It is a rather poor substitute , but we make out very well with it.”[10] There are other mentions of “coffee” in various letters through the spring of 1863, but it is unclear if it was real coffee, or Confederate coffee. One Georgia soldier did make note in April 1863, while stationed near Hamilton Crossing, that “pure Rio coffee” was selling for $6.00 per pound.”[11] There are more mentions of rye coffee following the battle of Gettysburg. Charles Blackford, serving on James Longstreet’s staff, mentions rye coffee in letters dated July 16 from Bunker Hill, and July 30 from Culpeper.[12] This seems to carry true through the end of 1864. Capt. R. E. Park, 12^th Alabama, makes mentions of a sutler selling Confederate coffee for $1.00 per pound. The coffee was made of rye.[13]

   The coffee shortage changed in early January 1864 (maybe even late December). Thomas Lupton, 39^th Battalion Virginia Cavalry, wrote that that were drawing coffee “real coffee, none of your confederate compounds with rice, potatoes and lard..."[14] Coffee was coming through the blockade, mostly through the port of Wilmington. While the Commissary General wanted this coffee reserved for sick and wounded men in the hospitals, coffee was making its way to the men in winter camps. A member of the 7^th Virginia Cavalry wrote on February 6 that they were being issued “a little real coffee and sugar.”[15] A member of the 44^th Georgia wrote on February 17: “We get genuine coffee occasionally.”[16] An officer in the 44^th North Carolina wrote of “genuine coffee” on February 19, and a member of the 48^th North Carolina mentioned “good old Rio coffee” on February 20.[17] This issue of real coffee continues through march and April, 1864.[18]

   Coffee rations (real coffee), seem to continue at a regular pace into mid-1864. A soldier in the 53^rd Georgia wrote from Petersburg on July 4 that he was drawing coffee and sugar. “We draw plenty of coffee. I am getting so I can't drink more than three or four cups of coffee for breakfast."[19] From the trenches, the same month, a member of the 27^th North Carolina thanked his family back home for not sending any coffee: “I am now and have been for the last 3 or 4 weeks having as much as I can use.”[20] This continued into early August, but by mid-August, there started to be mentions in the letter that they were not drawing any coffee and sugar.[21] Yet in October, a member of the 45^th Georgia wrote from Petersburg that they were getting “some coffee.”[22] Also from Petersburg on October 14, a member of the 18^th North Carolina wrote of receiving “pure coffee well sweetened.”[23] Likewise, a member of the 54^th North Carolina wrote in December that they were getting “pure coffee.”[24]

   There are sporadic mentions of coffee into 1865. Of course, by this time, a lot of soldiers were gone, either dead, deserted, or prisoners. Sources are limited. A soldier in the 5^th Alabama wrote of being issued sugar and coffee on February 26, and on March 2, and April 1. He does not indicate if it is real coffee, or Confederate coffee.[25]

   This is a topic that really seems to be misunderstood, and really needs some deeper scholarship. Was the issue of coffee the same for soldiers in the Army of Tennessee? Was it ever an issue for soldiers on garrison duty in Wilmington, or Mobile? How about the issue of coffee in hospitals? And then there is the issue of swapping Southern tobacco for yankee coffee in the many informal truces that occurred during the war. Did Southern tobacco rise in “price” during the trading when the North went through its tobacco crunch? Was coffee, or caffeine withdrawal, an impediment during battle? It seems that many times it is easier to fall back on the oft-repeated anecdotes that all Confederates were cut off from imported coffee for the duration of the war. That is simply not true. It is also interesting to note that Confederate soldiers, in the 200 or so letter and diary sets that I am using to write Feeding the Army of Northern Virginia, never mention making coffee from chicory, burnt corn, peas, or sweet potatoes. I’m not going to say that it did not happen, but the members of my test group are not writing about it. Maybe it occurred primarily in the civilian population, and not in the Army of Northern Virginia. Once again, this topic, on the Confederate side, needs much more research. 

   

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[1] Corson, My Dear Jennie, 2, 10; Wiggins, My Dearest Friend, 3-4.

[2] Wyckoff, The Civil War Letters of Alexander McNeill, 77-78.

[3] Hubbs, Voices from Company D, 42, 46.

[4] Allen and Bohannon, "Campaigning with 'Old Stonewall',"  28.

[5] Driver, 1st Battalion Virginia Infantry, 6-7.

[6] Monroe, “The Road to Gettysburg,” NCHR, 489; Carter, Welcome the Hour of Conflict, 130.

[7] Everson, Far, Far from Home, 117-118.

[8] Taylor, The Cry is War, War, War, 128.

[9]  McCrea, Red Dirt and Isinglass, 392; Welsh "A House Divided," 410.

[10] Wyckoff, The Civil War Letters of Alexander McNeill, 249.

[11] Allen and Bohannon, "Campaigning with 'Old Stonewall', 228.

[12] Blackford, Letters from Lee's Army, 198.

[13] Park, “Diary of Capt. R. E. Park,” SHSH 26:23.

[14] Driver, 1st Battalion Virginia Infantry, 62.

[15] Williams, Rebel Brothers, 187.

[16]  Burnett, “Letters of a Confederate Surgeon, McGarity,” 2:187.

[17] Wright, The Confederate Letters of Benjamin H. Freeman, 34; Dear Aunt, February 21, 1864, "Taking Care of Madison W. Richardson," 42.

[18] Hancok, Four Brothers in Gray, 253; McCrea, Red Dirt and Isinglass, 469; Hubbs, Voices from Company D, 232; Mellon, "A Florida Soldier," 270; Wright, The Confederate Letters of Benjamin H. Freeman, 35.

[19] Ronald, ed. The Stilwell Letters, 272

[20] Wagstaff, “Letters of Thomas Jackson Strayhorn,” NCHR, 323.

[21] Blackford, Letters from Lee's Army, 272; Wiggins, My Dearest Friend, 147.

[22] McCrea, Red Dirt and Isinglass, 518.

[23] Hancock, Four Brothers in Gray, 283.

[24] Henry, Pen in Hand, 136.

[25] Hubbs, Voices from Company D, 357, 365.